Summary
In the past decade we have witnessed a step change in macroeconomic performance. Both output growth and in ation have been much more stable than they were in the 1970s and 1980s.
Policymakers -keen that this development should be durable -have tried to understand the causes of this`Great Stability'.
Research has tended to place explanations into two groups: good luck in the form of fewer, So thinking about the way expectations are formed is likely to be an important step towards understanding the`Great Stability'. Standard economic models tend to assume that people form expectations using detailed knowledge about the way the economy works and the shocks that hit it. What if, instead, they use simple rules of thumb -or`heuristics' -to form their expectations? This paper explores that question using a very simple model in which output and in ation today depend on expectations of in ation tomorrow. Although the model is too abstract to explore questions about current monetary policy, it allows us to explore the more general issue of the role that expectations play in shaping economic performance.
In this model, predictions about future in ation affect decisions about what to do today. So if, other things being equal, in ation is expected to be high tomorrow, it will start to pick up today.
Predicting future in ation is dif cult because the economy is subject to temporary, unpredictable shocks. So people are assumed to use one of two heuristics. The rst is to assume that in ation tomorrow will be the same as in ation yesterday -the`lagged in ation' heuristic. The second is to assume that in ation tomorrow will equal a target announced by the central bank -the`in ation target' heuristic.
It seems reasonable to assume that people will only adopt a particular heuristic if it would have predicted in ation well over the past. That opens up the possibility that people might switch between them. Sometimes, when in ation has been close to target, they are likely to use the in ation target heuristic. When they do, we know that it helps to keep in ation stable because it acts as an anchor for expectations. Sometimes, however, shocks will move in ation away from the target. If people then switch to using a lagged in ation heuristic, there will not be a rm anchor for expectations. This means that there are periods like`Great Stabilities' in which in ation is very stable but these are interspersed with periods of greater volatility.
In our experiments, the in ation target is only used as a heuristic if it would have performed better than others in the past. There is no guarantee that it will be used. But the announcement of an in ation target at least opens up the possibility of more stable periods of economic performance.
And, as such, in ation in an economy with an in ation target tends to be more stable than in an economy without a target.
That illustrates the importance of the monetary policy framework in this model. Given that framework, what does this simple model say about how a central bank should operate? It is not possible for us to draw conclusions for the conduct of monetary policy in the real world because the model is so abstract. But we illustrate how, in this model, monetary policy can better stabilise the economy by responding to in ation expectations. This contrasts with many standard economic models, in which in ation expectations contain no information about the state of the economy that is not already apparent in other indicators. But in our model, in ation expectations do contain information about the state of the economy. They indicate which heuristic people are using and, therefore, how the economy will respond to shocks.
Introduction
The United Kingdom has experienced a period in which the volatility of both real and nominal variables has fallen. In the ten years to 2005, the standard deviation of output growth was less than a third of its value in the ten years to 1985; the standard deviation of in ation was less than a tenth of its value in the ten years to 1985. In ation persistence has also fallen dramatically.
Similar developments are apparent in other advanced economies such as the United States and the euro area. These changes have found various names: the`Great Stability',`Great Moderation' or the`NICE' (non-in ationary consistently expansionary) decade.
(1) Policymakers face a challenge in judging how to react to these changes because their causes, and therefore their durability, are uncertain, as Velde's (2004) lucid survey of the research so far makes clear.
There are two types of explanation for these changes. The rst is that the reduction in volatility is due to better monetary and scal policy. The second is that it re ects either smaller shocks, or changes in the way those shocks are propagated into output and in ation volatility. Thus far, econometric studies have tended to put most of the improvement down to what Velde described as policymakers having a`good hand' rather than engaging in`good play': witness the line of work including Stock and Watson (2002) , Sims and Zha (2004) , Cogley and Sargent (2005) and many others. But Bernanke (2004) suggested that what is counted as good luck in such studies includes the effect of better monetary policy in anchoring in ation expectations.
Our paper presents a model in which the link between uctuations in the time-series properties of in ation and expectations-formation is explicit. We work with a monetary overlapping generations model, in which we assume agents form expectations by choosing amongst simple rules of thumb or`heuristics'. Agents work when they are young and sell their output to the old in exchange for money, which is the only store of value available to them. They consume using that money when they are old. Young agents seek to minimise the disutility from working when young and maximise the utility they will gain from consuming when old. In doing this, they face the problem of forecasting the future purchasing power of the money balances they accumulate when young. In other words, they need to forecast the change in the price level. Uncertainty about future in ation is generated by our assumption that the productivity of young agents is subject to shocks.
(1) See, for example, Bernanke (2004) and King (2003) .
We contrast the rational expectations equilibrium with that which emerges when agents use a nite set of heuristics to make their forecasts of in ation. They choose between the heuristics on the basis of their performance in forecasting in ation in the recent past. We assume they observe that performance with some noise but, the better the true past performance of a heuristic, the greater chance there is that an agent uses it to make the next period's forecast. These heuristics, as Gigerenzer et al (1999) and others have noted, are both fast to compute and frugal in their information requirements. Model-consistent expectations are attractive devices for those who work with model economies, but it may actually not be rational for agents to have acquired them, given the informational and computational costs of doing so. Our agents choose between two heuristics: one that sets forecast in ation equal to the steady-state value, which we term loosely an`in ation target' heuristic, and one in which forecast in ation is set to the latest realisation of in ation, which we term the`lagged in ation' heuristic.
Our model is closed by a process for nominal money growth, which characterises central bank behaviour. We use two such processes to study the dynamics of in ation: one in which the central bank follows the rule that would be optimal in the event that expectations were rational; and another that assumes the central bank attempts to take account of heuristic behaviour.
Our strategy is to use a model of heuristics to explain the Great Stability. We are therefore exploring an idea put forward by Branch and Evans (2005) . And in combining a monetary overlapping generations model with heuristics, we are borrowing from Brock and de Fontnouvelle (2000) , who did this in their quest to see whether heuristic behaviour could sustain equilibria in which paper money is valued.
When agents switch between in ation-forecasting heuristics, the time-series properties of in ation change over time. On average, the majority of agents use the in ation target heuristic. But there are times when everyone does, and times when no-one does. The way the economy propagates productivity shocks into in ation depends on the proportion using each heuristic. Because this proportion uctuates, so does the way shocks are propagated into in ation. So the volatility of in ation is higher than in a rational expectations version of the model. It also means that there are greater uctuations in the volatility of in ation and in the persistence of in ation. This model, for either of the money processes we use, exhibits pronounced episodes of high, followed by low in ation volatility and persistence. When agents use the in ation target heuristic, in ation tends to be less variable and less persistent than when more agents use the lagged in ation heuristic.
We contrast the money process that would be optimal under rational expectations with one that attempts to take account of heuristics. We do so with the usual caveats that must accompany welfare analysis in overlapping generations models. Our welfare criterion is the unconditional expectation of the sum of the welfare of the old and young in any time period. This is equivalent to maximising the average level of welfare over all generations.
Under rational expectations, the optimal policy is for money growth to respond to the level of productivity. Such a rule eliminates both the volatility of labour supply, which is costly to the young, and the volatility of consumption, which is costly to the old. The success of monetary policy under rational expectations can be attributed to its leverage over expectations. By committing to future policy actions, monetary policy has extra leverage over current labour supply and in ation.
That leverage is not available when agents use heuristics so we investigate how policy might adapt in those circumstances. The model under heuristics is highly non-linear. There is no analytical expression for optimal policy available, so we con ne ourselves to a search for a rule that responds linearly to two important state variables in the model: productivity and expected in ation. The best rule -according to our welfare criterion -amongst this`two-pillar' class of rule increases money growth when productivity is high, and by more than under rational expectations; and it reduces money growth when in ation expectations rise. The welfare bene ts from shifting away from the rational expectations policy are greater during periods when agents are using the backward-looking heuristic. Despite a monetary policy that attempts to take account of heuristics, heuristic switching still occurs and so there are still uctuations in in ation volatility and in ation persistence. At the same time this model generates uctuations in the estimated disturbances to linear autoregressive equations for in ation, echoing the ndings of econometricians on real data.
The message from the paper to this point is that very stable macroeconomic outturns should not be taken for granted. But we go on to explore the notion that the widespread adoption of explicit in ation objectives by central banks can be modelled as the provision of a heuristic to which agents did not previously have access. When we introduce an in ation target heuristic to agents, we nd that at least some adopt it immediately, and that subsequently the volatility of in ation is lower, despite the heuristic switching that ensues. We illustrate how the impact of the introduction of the in ation target depends on how poorly performing is the heuristic with which agents start out.
The model
Our model is an overlapping generations model with money. It is deliberately stylised and was chosen as the simplest possible model in which agents must forecast future in ation.
Agents live for two periods. . We denote expectations formed by agents using the operator E t . In some cases that will refer to rational expectations and in others will refer to a heuristic. At each stage we will make clear how agents are forming their expectations.
Formally, young agents solve the following problem:
The problem that old agents solve is degenerate. They maximise utility by spending all their real balances on consumption goods. The young accumulate money from the old and from the government. The government's budget constraint implies that the nominal money stock evolves according to:
where D t > 0 is output purchased from the private sector in exchange for money. We assume that (2) Note that, for simplicity, we assume that there is no discounting of future consumption.
government purchases are used for purposes that do not yield private utility.
(3) The instrument of monetary policy is the growth rate of the nominal money stock, G:
so that, since P t D t D G t M t 1 , the nominal value of government purchases equals the increase in the nominal money supply: there is no distinction between scal and monetary policy in this model.
The young consumer's problem can now be written as:
; the rst-order condition for labour supply is given by:
This equation makes it clear that young agents have to make forecasts. If expected in ation tomorrow is high, agents expect the value of any money balances they accumulate by working when young to be eroded when they are old. Their demand for money balances will be lower. Uncertainty about the future price level is introduced by a simple, stochastic process for productivity (A t ):
where Z t follows a lognormal distribution.
For ease of exposition, we proceed by taking a rst-order approximation around the non-stochastic steady state. Using lower case letters to denote log deviations from steady state, the (log-linearised) rst-order condition for labour supply is:
We use m t to denote the log deviation of real money balances,
, from steady state. The real (3) We could, analogously, assume that government purchases are redistributed back to agents, and that these redistributions enter utility in a way that was additively separable from other components. Our marginal condition for labour supply would be identical in this model, although consumption and mean levels of welfare would not be. Dropping the simpli cation used here would not affect the impact of heuristic switching on the dynamics of macroeconomic outcomes. money demand condition is:
The linearised version of the government budget constraint is given by equation (8) below, where we denote the steady-state in ation rate as 5 and use g t to denote the absolute (note, not log) deviation of the growth rate of nominal money from its steady-state level.
We linearise around a positive steady-state in ation rate (5 > 1) to ensure that the frequency of negative government spending levels D implied by money growth g is negligible: we do not regard such outcomes as economically meaningful.
Linearising the productivity process gives:
where lower case t is the log deviation of the disturbance Z t from its steady-state value, 1.
To summarise the model: to maximise their expected utility, young agents must forecast in ation.
Uncertainty about future in ation is introduced by uctuations in the demand for real money balances arising from shocks to productivity. If those movements are not matched by equal movements in the nominal money stock, in ation will uctuate. In the next section we calculate the monetary policy that maximises welfare when agents form rational expectations of in ation.
Rational expectations and optimal policy
The model is described by equations (6), (7), (8) and (9) together with an equation for money growth, g t . We assume that monetary policy is characterised by the design of a rule for money growth to which the policymaker commits. The rule is designed to maximise a particular measure of welfare. It is designed before any realisation of productivity is observed so although money growth can respond to realisations of productivity, the policy rule itself is invariant to changes in productivity.
(4) The coef cient on g results from the fact that .1 C g/ D 5 in steady state.
Our welfare measure is the sum of the utility of the young and old agents:
This differs from the utility function of a young agent (equation (1)) because it adds the utility of today's old to the disutility of work experienced by today's young. We assume that policy is designed to maximise the unconditional expectation of welfare. This maximises the average level of welfare across all generations and across all possible realisations of productivity.
We assume that monetary policy maximises welfare taking the steady-state level of money growth as given. In this model, there would be welfare improvements from lowering the mean level of money growth and the associated government purchases (which do not yield private utility). We abstract from that component of policy to focus on the stabilisation role of monetary policy.
Hence, the curvature of the welfare function means that, by stabilising the economy, we maximise the average level of welfare. Note that, conditional on a level of productivity that is known and different from the steady-state level of productivity, agents will not prefer steady-state levels of labour supply and future consumption. But, before the value of productivity is revealed, they will prefer stable over variable labour supply and consumption because of the curvature in utility.
Welfare is maximised when labour supply and consumption do not deviate from their steady-state levels.
Our welfare function is
model's driving variable, productivity:
It is straightforward to show that, for an arbitrary value of , the rational expectations solutions for real money balances and in ation are given by:
and:
Policy can completely stabilise employment when m t D a t : From equation (12) and, when D 5, the equilibrium in ation equation (13) can be simpli ed to:
We already know that real money balances equal productivity because labour supply is stabilised:
so that:
A policy rule in the form of equation (11), setting D 5, eliminates all of the welfare costs of macroeconomic instability. Such a rule generates movements in in ation in the next period that are equal to the realisation of productivity in the current period. This strategy means that the real value when old of any money balances accumulated when young is unaffected by realisations of productivity. Anticipating this, the young have no incentive to change their labour supply in response to changes in productivity. With labour supply constant and the impact of productivity on real money balances offset by in ation, the consumption of the old is constant. The key to the success of monetary policy in stabilising both labour supply and consumption is its leverage over not only the current money stock but also over anticipated future in ation. Indeed, it is clear from (6) that monetary policy can stabilise labour supply in the face of productivity disturbances only through its leverage over in ation expectations.
To re-emphasise: note that complete stabilisation of consumption and employment is optimal because of the curvature of agents' utility (a feature preserved by our quadratic approximation).
Note too that monetary policy does not prevent agents responding to productivity shocks; it simply creates conditions that means that it is optimal for agents not to.
Modelling the choice of heuristic
So far we have assumed model-consistent expectations to provide a benchmark against which to compare subsequent departures from that assumption. Many have argued that in reality agents would nd it too costly, or would not have the means to collect the information and carry out the computations required for a rational expectations equilibrium to be achieved. The route we choose is to adopt a model in which agents may have heterogeneous expectations and in which those expectations are based on simple heuristics.
The heuristic choice literature
The literature on heuristics is itself now very large and ably surveyed by one of its recent leaders in Hommes (2005) . He charts the history of this strand of thought from the suggestion by Keynes (1936) that uctuations in sentiment would in uence the macroeconomy; through Simon (1957) , who explained that agents were`boundedly rational' in the face of costs of collecting information and computing the outcomes of their decisions. Another landmark is the emergence of experimental evidence that agents use simple heuristics to make decisions, culminating in Kahneman's (2003) Nobel lecture. This led to a large research programme exploring why it may have proven bene cial for nature to endow us with such heuristics: a topic that occupies, for example, Gigerenzer et al (1999) . We use a model in which agents choose between a nite set of heuristics based on noisy observations of past forecast performance. The papers from which we draw most inspiration in this respect are Brock and Hommes (1997) , Brock and de Fontnouvelle (2000) and Evans (2005, 2006) who in turn ground their decision-making model in the discrete decision, multinomial logit models set out in Manski and McFadden (1981) . (6) We are not the rst to combine a monetary overlapping generations model with a model of heuristic expectations formation. Brock and de Fontnouvelle (2000) do just this. But their concern is very different. Early students of rational expectations, monetary overlapping generations models noted that these models generated equilibria in which money had value and equilibria in which it did not. This was a source of discomfort since paper money in reality is pervasive, and yet there was no guide as to which amongst the model's equilibria should or would be selected. Brock and de Fontnouvelle (2000) is an effort to see whether heuristic behaviour can lead to monetary equilibria: they nd that it can.
Heuristic choice in our model
Our agents select from two heuristics described by:
The rst predictor (E 1;t tC1 ) sets expected in ation equal to the latest observed outturn. We term this the`lagged in ation' predictor. This predictor is based on lagged in ation ( t 1 ) and not current in ation ( t ) which will itself depend on agents' expectations and will not be realised at the time agents are forming their expectations. The second predictor (E 2;t tC1 ) sets expected in ation equal to the target (since represents the deviation of in ation from target we have (6) See also de Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) . They show how exchange rate dynamics, and uctuations in the performance of fundamentals models of the exchange rate, are affected by heuristic switching, embedding the Brock and Hommes approach, using the same model of predictor choice that we employ. E 2;t tC1 D 0). This we term the`in ation target' predictor. (7) This particular set of predictors includes plausible models for agents to use to forecast, but is itself arbitrary. For most of our
analysis, exactly what is in this set of predictors is not important. What is important is that there are different predictors and that switching amongst them will generate changes in the way the model propagates shocks. However, later in the paper, we interpret the in ation target predictor as one that can be added to the set of available predictors if the central bank declares an explicit in ation objective. At that point it will be crucial to consider predictor sets that initially exclude, and later include, the in ation target predictor, so our predictor set must be taken more literally.
Agents in our model differ from those embedded within adaptive learning models. In those models, the tools that agents use to forecast encompass the true model. In variants where agents have access to the entire history of data, they may eventually learn the true coef cients. Our agents' models are both misspeci ed, and agents have a xed window for evaluating their predictors that prevents the apparent performance of these predictors converging over time.
We follow our predecessors in this literature and assume that the heuristics are selected according to their recent forecast performance. Speci cally, we de ne the objective function as:
for i D 1; 2. The term on the right-hand side is the`mean squared error' of the heuristic, calculated over the previous H periods. This captures the ability of the heuristic to match the behaviour of in ation in the recent past. The objective can be thought of as some form of`utility function': agents prefer heuristics with higher F scores.
The proportion of agents choosing each predictor, n i;t is determined by the following function:
where the parameter > 0 is referred to in previous work as the`intensity of choice'. Brock and de Fontnouvelle (2000) note that in this model is related to the amount of noise in observing the forecast error function F.
The larger is , the more accurately agents observe the past forecast (7) Mojon and Diron (2005) document how using the central bank's stated target as a forecast rule of thumb can perform well relative to alternative models.
The thought experiment that agents are conducting here is awed, and highlights the difference between their behaviour and that under rational expectations: the performance of a heuristic in forecasting actually depends on how many agents use it for forecasting. Agents neglect this fact when they compute F from recent observations on . (9) The authors steer the reader to the unabridged (1996) version of this paper, University of Wisconsin Working performance of the heuristics, and the more the portion of agents using each heuristic responds to forecast performance. The limit of D 1 represents the case in which all agents observe perfectly -and hence choose -the best heuristic in each period. As approaches zero, we approach a situation in which the noise in observing predictor performance is so large that predictor choice is entirely non-systematic. To emphasise, with a nite , the presence of measurement error means that agents will not always pick the best-performing heuristic. But the probability that they will pick a particular heuristic will increase with its past forecasting performance. The share of the population using each of the two heuristics will equal the probability that any individual picks that heuristic.
Aggregating across young agents, we have the following:
Thus the real money demand relation under heuristics is given by:
Model properties under rational expectations and a single heuristic
We simulate the model comprising the equation for n 1 , the portion using the lagged in ation heuristic, (15), and the linearised equations for real money demand, the government budget constraint, and the productivity and money processes (equations ( Critically assessing the suitability of these parameters is dif cult, given the highly stylised structure of the model. We emphasise simply that we are using this model in the hope that it can say something interesting about the dynamics of an economy over business cycle frequencies, and be of interest to monetary policy makers who have to design a policy to stabilise the economy over such time periods.
Nevertheless, some discussion of our chosen parameters is warranted. Our choices for and imply that the elasticity of real money demand to expected in ation (equal to 1 C
) is close to
Paper no. 9624, for a complete account of this interpretation (and others) of the model. unity, which means that real money balances are relatively responsive to expected in ation. Marcet and Nicolini (2003) use parameter values that imply that real money demand is relatively less responsive to changes in expected in ation (their parameters would imply a slope 1 C of around 0.15), but simulations under this type of parameterisation are qualitatively similar to those we present here.
Our choice of 5 implies that the steady-state in ation rate is 2% per period, which matches the rate chosen by some central banks if we interpret a period as one year. This choice bounds our choice for the variance of the productivity disturbance: this, together with the design of the process for monetary policy, g, will govern the frequency with which the implied level of government spending is negative, which we want to keep to a minimum. The degree of persistence in the shocks affects the chance of lagged in ation proving to be a good forecaster of future in ation, and therefore of agents using it as a heuristic. The variance of productivity implied by our assumed values for 2 and is of a similar order of magnitude to cyclical output variations.
The ability of the model to generate switches in heuristic use is also determined by the evaluation horizon H and the intensity of choice (which we prefer to interpret as the accuracy with which heuristic performance is observed). The shorter the evaluation horizon, the larger the uctuations in observed forecast performance. The greater the intensity of choice, the larger the response of heuristic choice to movements in forecast performance. The important thing for the story in this paper is that some economically signi cant degree of heuristic switching occurs.
The table below records some time-series properties of four versions of our overlapping generations model. We report variances as an index for which 100 equals the rational expectations case. In each case the model is solved under the money process that is optimal under rational expectations. The rst column reports the rational expectations version of the model discussed in Section 3. The variance and autocorrelation of in ation are calculated from the equivalent moments of the forcing process, productivity. For the other cases, statistics are computed from a 20,000-period simulation with all variables initialised at steady-state values.
Lagged in ation' refers to a model in which agents are restricted to the heuristic that in ation tomorrow is equal to in ation yesterday.`In ation target' refers to a model in which they are restricted to the in ation target heuristic. These results serve as a benchmark against which we compare our model when agents switch between the two heuristics. They also provide some intuition about what happens to the time-series properties of variables as the number using each heuristic switches between the extremes implied by these rst simulations. The rst row of Table A 
Model properties under heuristic switching
In this section we report the results from simulating the model when agents switch between the two heuristics depending on their past forecasting performance. As a benchmark, we continue to assume that money growth follows the process that would be optimal if agents formed rational expectations. The summary statistics are shown in Table B . Once again, these simulations are over 20,000 periods. We continue to normalise all variances to equal 100 in the rational expectations case. Overall, the variance of in ation in this heuristic-switching economy is higher than when all agents were forced to use the in ation target heuristic but lower than in the economy where all agents used the lagged in ation heuristic. The same is true of uctuations in the small-sample variance of in ation. In Chart 1 below, we extract from our 20,000-period simulation an illustrative subsample of 1,000
consecutive periods. The top panel of the chart shows how the portion using the lagged in ation heuristic, n 1 uctuates. It sometimes reaches the upper bound of 100%, but is generally close to zero. On average, the number using the lagged in ation heuristic is about 30%. Switching between the two heuristics is an important determinant of the time-series behaviour of variables.
Chart 2 is an alternative -histogram -representation of these movements in n 1 . It shows that the distribution of n 1 is bimodal. If the intensity of choice ( ) was in nite, then we would expect the observations to be either n 1 D 0 or n 1 D 1 as agents are able to perfectly observe the best performing predictor. But since is nite (though large) there are some observations between these extremes.
While the model spends most of the time in a region where the majority of agents are using the in ation target heuristic, there are episodes where almost all are using the lagged in ation heuristic. These results re ect the fact that agents in our model use a nite sample of recent data to evaluate predictor performance: in the jargon of the learning literature, they assess forecast performance using`constant gain'. If instead we allowed agents in the model to learn with decreasing gain' (that is, using the entire history of the data), the model would generate a histogram centred around a single, interior value of n 1 . This is because our model exhibits what has been called`negative feedback' from heuristic use to heuristic performance. These aspects of (11) Indeed, when plotting in ation alongside the series for productivity (a t ) it is dif cult to discern by eye how the productivity shocks are transmitted into in ation outcomes. The reason is simply that heuristic switching changes the coef cients in the model equations: that is, the mapping from exogenous shocks to endogenous variables. share using lagged inflation heuristic (n 1 ) frequency macroeconomic models with predictor choice are discussed in Branch and Evans (2005) who suggest that this negative feedback effect may be relatively uncommon in macroeconomic models.
Instead, they construct a simple model with`positive feedback', characterised by multiple equilibria, some of which are unstable. At such equilibria, disturbances that, for example, increase the proportion of agents using a given predictor improve the relative performance of that predictor, further increasing the proportion, and so on.
Positive feedback and multiple equilibria can be generated in our model under suitable parameterisations for the productivity process and the conduct of monetary policy. For example, we found that the monetary reaction function (12) 5 1 g t D m t 1 C 0:5a t 0:25n 1;t t 1 was able to generate these properties when we set D 0:6 . But under policy that is optimal when agents form rational expectations, and indeed, under the policy that attempts to take account of heuristic switching that we derive below, we have negative feedback between heuristic use and performance.
The bottom three panels of Chart 1 illustrate how heuristic switching generates small-sample (12) The coef cient on the lag of real money balances is suggested by the form of the reaction function used by Branch and Evans (2005) .
uctuations in the time-series properties of in ation. The panels labelled rst and second-order autocorrelation report rolling coef cients from a regression of in ation on two lags of itself. The bottom panel plots the variance of in ation. These moments are calculated over a horizon of 50 periods. When the proportion of agents using the lagged in ation heuristic is high for a sustained period, so is the variance of in ation; at these times the coef cient of the rst lag of in ation in an autoregression of in ation is high, and the coef cient on the second lag is low. We gain some insight into these uctuations by xing n 1 and writing the reduced form for in ation:
As we see in the simulations, so in this reduced-form equation for in ation we notice that the higher is n 1 the higher is the coef cient on t 1 and the lower is the corresponding coef cient on
These uctuations in the autocorrelation function for in ation echo the debates about what has caused the uctuations in in ation persistence, documented by, amongst others, Benati (2004) and Levin and Piger (2004) . That debate has thrown up two broad answers: that changes in in ation persistence have come about because of structural change; or that they re ect changes in monetary policy making and the introduction of in ation targeting. Our model generates changes in small-sample moments of in ation that re ect neither, but instead are the result of heuristic switching.
Monetary policy under heuristic switching
So far we have worked with the money growth process that would be optimal under rational expectations. We now consider if the central bank can improve on this process in the light of its knowledge about expectations formation. There are two motivations. From a positive standpoint, we can check that the heuristic-switching explanation for the appearance (and possible disappearance) of low in ation volatility is robust to cases in which the central bank follows a more sensible policy. From a normative standpoint, we can highlight the cost of the central bank incorrectly assuming that expectations are rational.
In Section 3, we showed that, under rational expectations, a rule for money growth that responded to productivity could stabilise labour input and consumption. It did so through its impact on anticipated future money growth and in ation. When agents use heuristics, commitment to a policy rule no longer delivers any direct leverage on expected future in ation. Policy only affects expectations indirectly through past in ation. The lack of direct leverage over expectations means that, unlike the rational expectations case, policy cannot offset all the welfare losses arising from productivity shocks. It needs to adapt to the use of heuristics.
Additional complications arise in attempting a study of the welfare consequences of policy under heuristics. Heuristic switching makes the model non-linear, even when the individual decision rules are linearised. (13) This non-linearity causes two problems.
The rst problem is that we cannot derive an optimal monetary policy analytically, even when we use the quadratic approximation to welfare explained above. So we have to resort to numerical methods. We de ne a class of candidate monetary policy processes, and then simulate the model under each rule within that class, compute welfare, and look for the rule that scores the highest.
The particular non-linear nature of our model means that we have to simulate for millions of periods to get reliable estimates of our welfare function. So we must con ne our search across alternative policy rules to make the exercise manageable. We will work with the following class of rules for money growth:
This process allows the policymaker to respond to productivity and to data on expected in ation.
In that sense it operates a`two-pillar' strategy. We assume that policymakers receive data on expected in ation, but do not attempt directly to internalise the interaction between policy, endogenous in ation outcomes and n 1 . (Indirectly, policymakers will choose the combinations of
The differences in means will not affect the welfare criterion we have chosen, which is de ned on variances. So it must be stressed that our search can rank policy rules only according to their stabilisation properties, and not their effect on means.
We focus on rules that respond to productivity and in ation expectations for two reasons. First, this class of rules allows us to nest the optimal policy under rational expectations, which responds to the only state variable in that model, productivity. Second, it also allows the policymaker to respond to another state variable in the heuristic-switching model, expected in ation. And that happens to echo the concerns of policymakers in reality.
We can get some intuition for why a rule like this is likely to work by considering an extreme case that the policymaker will face: one in which all agents use the in ation target heuristic. When everyone is using the in ation target heuristic (n 1 D 0), the labour supply function (6) collapses to:
Fluctuations in labour supply are inevitable. The average expected welfare of young agents is lower than when agents have rational expectations and policy responds optimally. Under heuristics, monetary policy is powerless to in uence this. But monetary policy can help old agents. The consumption of old agents at date t is:
and the evolution of real money balances is given by:
so that the policymaker can fully stabilise c t by committing to the policy rule:
(14) These small differences in mean in ation will also have a small effect on the performance of the in ation target heuristic under the alternative policy rules. The higher the mean in ation rate, the worse the (zero) in ation target heuristic performs, and the smaller the portion of agents who use it.
(15) Note that expectations-based rules have been argued to have bene ts in other contexts. For example, Evans and Honkapohja (2003) have recommended them as devices for implementing monetary policy to ensure that the rational expectations equilibrium is stable under least-squares learning.
which, since 1C C > 1, implies a stronger response to productivity shocks than under rational expectations.
In the general case, where some agents use the lagged in ation heuristic, labour supply and the demand for real money balances depend on in ation expectations, which in turn depend on lagged in ation. In that case, even in the absence of a current productivity shock, labour supply and output can uctuate. Without any policy action, in ation will move to bring the real value of money balances into line with output. These uctuations are costly so monetary policy might do better by responding to in ation expectations as well as to productivity. Of course, one thing this discussion reveals is that the ideal response to productivity and in ation expectations should itself depend on n 1 . However, to make the analysis more tractable, we stick to rules that involve constant, independent values of 1 and 2 .
The best rule in our grid search is one with values of 1 D 2 and 2 D 1:75. This policy shares a feature with the optimal policy under rational expectations in that money growth is expanded when productivity is unusually high. A positive shock to productivity reduces the price level; a positive money growth response by policy therefore acts to offset that. The policy response under heuristics is to respond more aggressively (recall that under rational expectations, equals 5, the steady-state rate of in ation, which is 1.02). We believe that this response allows the policy to perform well when few agents believe the in ation target: as described above, in this setting, an aggressive response to productivity can help to stabilise the consumption of old agents. The heuristics policy also suggests that money growth should fall when expected in ation rises. When expected in ation rises, labour supply and demand for real balances fall. Monetary policy can stabilise in ation by contracting the money supply.
The rule considered here generates higher welfare than arbitrary persistent processes for money growth, xed money growth, and the policy that would be optimal under rational expectations (derived in Section 3). The welfare surface appeared well behaved in the space used for the grid search. Chart 3 below shows how welfare differs under the two policy rules at different values of n 1 , the portion using the lagged in ation heuristic. We arrange the simulated periods according to their associated value of n 1 and calculate average welfare at each value of n 1 .
(16) Using this short cut naturally raises the issue of whether it would be appropriate to build a model of heuristic policy design on the part of the central bank to go with the heuristic expectations-formation on the part of agents in the model. We leave that issue for future research.
Chart 3: Welfare generated by alternative policy rules as the share of agents using the lagged in ation heuristic varies Share of agents (n 1 ) using lagged inflation heuristic
As we can see, when the central bank tries to take account of heuristics, it delivers higher welfare than the rational expectations policy at all values of n 1 . The welfare improvement achieved by the heuristics-adapted policy is greater for larger values of n 1 : the more agents are using the lagged in ation heuristic, the greater the bene t of following the policy adapted for heuristics, or, put another way, the greater the cost of policymakers mistakenly following the policy that would be appropriate under rational expectations.
(17) Table C shows summary statistics to compare with earlier vintages of the model, once again based on simulations of 20,000 periods. We continue to report moments of in ation as an index where 100 is the value for the model under rational expectations and the associated optimal policy.
(17) We have calculated that the minimum value for these costs, when few or no agents are using the lagged in ation heuristic, is still more than ten times the welfare cost of mistakenly pursuing the heuristics policy when agents actually have rational expectations. This is an indication that if policymakers were unsure how agents arrived at their forecasts a safe policy would be to assume that agents did not have rational expectations. This contrasts somewhat with Gaspar et al (2006) , who found that the optimal RE policy does quite a good job of replicating the optimal policy in a model where agents are doing adaptive learning. When agents switch between heuristics, the variance of in ation is somewhat lower when policy adapts to that, rather than following the policy that would be optimal under rational expectations.
Under the policy that adapts to heuristics, the variance of small (50 period) sample estimates of the variance of in ation is about a quarter that under rational expectations optimal policy. But note that it is still more than two and a half times the gure we observe for the model under rational expectations. Note too that in ation is a little less persistent.
Chart 4 plots data from 1,000 consecutive periods of the simulation used to compute the gures in Table C . Notice that the uctuations in n 1 , the proportion of agents using the lagged in ation heuristic, are, to the eye, as pronounced as those under the policy that would be optimal under rational expectations. Chart 5 compares the histograms for n 1 that are generated in the heuristic-switching economy when policy follows both the rational expectations optimal rule and when it adapts to the use of heuristics. Relative to the rational expectations optimal policy, the heuristics-adapted policy reduces the probability mass at both extremes of n 1 and increases it slightly at interior values.
Under both policies heuristic switching generates small-sample uctuations in the time-series properties of in ation. We can see this from the volatility in the coef cients on lagged in ation in an autoregression for in ation. The bottom panel of Chart 4 plots the variance of the residuals from a rolling 50-period regression for in ation on its own lags. This variance is clearly moving over time and tends to be high when the variance of in ation is high, and vice versa. We plot this time series to link our analysis to the econometric studies that report that large fractions of recent declines in macroeconomic volatility are down to`good luck'. Optimal policy under rational expectations Policy adapted for heuristics share using lagged inflation heuristic (n 1 ) frequency number using the in ation target heuristic is low, the variance of in ation is low, and the variance of the shocks in a simple autoregression is low. In the language of the applied literature on the Great Stability, the econometrician estimates there to have been a period of good luck, when the true variance of the disturbances to our model economy is unchanging.
Model properties after the introduction of an in ation target heuristic
Thus far, we have investigated whether switching amongst heuristics can generate uctuations in small-sample estimates of the volatility of in ation that are consistent with the marked reduction in volatility seen in recent decades. And our contention is that it can. These uctuations occur regardless of whether monetary policy adopts a different rule. So far we have considered the set of heuristics as something beyond the control of policymakers. In this section, we assume that the monetary policy framework can in uence the set of heuristics from which agents choose, and consider what happens when agents are given access to an in ation target heuristic, that was not previously available to them. We suggest that this may be a way of formalising what happened when many central banks adopted numerical objectives for in ation. This exercise is related to one conducted by Orphanides and Williams (2005) . They interpret the introduction of a numerical objective for the central bank as equivalent to giving agents knowledge of the constant in the in ation process, knowledge that they show improves agents' estimates of the dynamics of that process. for s D f1; :::; t 1g. Second, agents use ols h to form E t . tC1 /. Third, another data point for time t is generated. Agents add this to their data set, and return to the second step. The value of h used to compute numbers under the`self con rming' column in Table D is the number to which this iterative process converges. (19) The two columns under`persistent' repeat this analysis, but using a persistent process for money growth where the persistence and variance are set equal to the values chosen for the productivity process (and with no correlation between the two). Results are computed from a 20,000-period simulation in which the target is introduced half way through.
We report several details. First, in the top rows, we give statistics for the economy before the introduction of the in ation target heuristic into the set of heuristics from which agents choose.
These are: the variance of in ation (row labelled`var(5)'); the variance of short-sample estimates of that variance (`var(var(5) )'); and the persistence of in ation (` (5)'). For the second half of the simulation, after the introduction of the in ation target, we report these same statistics, but with two additions. First, we report the average value of n 1 in the ve periods immediately following the introduction of the target, and label this row`n 1 impact'. Second, we report the mean of n 1 over the life of the rest of the simulation (labelled`mean(n 1 )'). In this table, we normalise variances and the variance of variances relative to those computed for the top left-hand case in this table, the case where agents have a single, simple lagged in ation heuristic, and policy is conducted according to the rule that would be optimal under rational expectations.
The basic message is that the immediate impact effect of the introduction of the in ation target heuristic is maximal when, prior to that, agents use only the lagged in ation heuristic. In both thè lagged in ation' simulations, n 1 , the number using the lagged in ation heuristic, drops to zero in the period immediately following introduction of the in ation target (albeit rising again thereafter). This is shown by the zeros recorded in the row labelled`n 1 impact'. It turns out that in our model, if we exogenously impose that n 1 D 1, it greatly worsens the forecast performance of that heuristic, which is why when agents are free to choose between two heuristics, they jump to using the in ation target for a while.
This begs the question of why agents were content to use only the lagged in ation heuristic prior to the introduction of the target. It is beyond the scope of this paper to model the complete process that speci es the evolution of the set of heuristics that agents use. But for comparison, we have the simulations where agents start out life using a lagged in ation heuristic based on an (19) The point to which this iteration converges might also be referred to as a restricted perceptions equilibrium. Subject to the restricted perceptions of the in ation process that agents have, their projections are optimal. optimal projection of in ation tomorrow on in ation yesterday (the`self con rming' simulations).
Able to use such a projection, one which performs better than the simple lagged in ation heuristic, the effect of the new target heuristic is more muted: this is true under both our`rational expectations' and`persistent' monetary policy processes.
Similarly, we see that when agents are constrained to use the simple lagged in ation heuristic, the introduction of the in ation target has its largest effect on the time-series properties of in ation, reducing the variability of in ation and the uctuations in small-sample estimates of this variability. (20) 9 Conclusions
In the past decade both in ation and output growth seem to have become more stable in advanced economies. This coincided with the convergence of in ation expectations on in ation targets. We have illustrated how an economy populated by agents who choose amongst heuristics for forecasting in ation can generate uctuations in the variance of in ation. There are periods in which agents use the in ation target heuristic, and there are periods when many agents choose to use a heuristic based on lagged in ation. In the former, a given shock will generate less variability in in ation. But a sequence of shocks that reduces the ability of the in ation target heuristic to match in ation in the past can lead agents to switch to the lagged in ation heuristic.
We asked how monetary policy might adapt to agents' use of heuristics. Under rational expectations, a rule for money growth that responded to productivity could stabilise completely labour supply and consumption. It did so through its leverage over expectations. When agents use heuristics, monetary policy has no direct leverage over in ation expectations, which are determined entirely by the past behaviour of in ation. Relative to the policy that would be optimal under rational expectations, a money growth rule which reacts to both productivity and to in ation expectations can better stabilise the economy. Even under such a policy, agents switch back and forth between heuristics and the time-series properties of in ation tend to uctuate.
Our nal exercise was to simulate the introduction of an in ation target heuristic. When we did (20) We repeated the simulation many times and found that the main determinant of the impact effect was the assumption about the heuristic that agents used before the introduction of the in ation target. This was more important than, for example, the recent history of productivity shocks in the periods preceding the target introduction.
this, there was some evidence that the introduction of this heuristic improves macroeconomic outcomes by reducing the volatility of in ation. By how much, and to what extent agents use the new heuristic depends on the performance of the heuristics they had before. These results suggest that some of the improvements seen in the United Kingdom and elsewhere could be locked in, at least if the in ation targeting regime can be thought of as having made available the simple heuristic that`in ation will equal the target'.
